


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WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Indonesian Communists Active in East and Central Java

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INDONESIAN COMMUNISTS ACTIVE IN EAST AND CENTRAL JAVA

The Indonesian Communist Party, resurgent in East and Central Java early this year, was hit hard by government operations in June and July. Heavy losses among the small group of party leaders who survived the postcoup debacle in 1965 will probably intensify factionalism and create new obstacles to reorganization efforts.

Despite this, Communist political activity and terrorism are likely to continue in East and Central Java. These provinces have long been areas of party strength and the situation there still offers a good potential for Communist rebuilding efforts.

The Indonesian Government is aware of the acute need for economic improvement if the Communists' appeal among the people is to be undercut, but it is hard pressed to find funds for more than token projects. For some years to come, therefore, the government will probably have to rely on military and intelligence efforts to suppress the party.

Background

East and Central Java were the major areas of support for both the Communist Party and former president Sukarno prior to the attempted Communist coup in 1965. Following the coup, the army purged the civil provincial administrations of Sukarnoist and Communist elements and screened, to the best of its ability, the various armed services. It imprisoned and often executed Communist cadremen and members of Communist front organizations. Particularly in East Java, where devout Muslims have significant strength, civilians either as-

sisted the army or independently undertook mass executions of Communist-25X1
munists.

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25X1East Java

This militant attitude first prevailed in East Java. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

an isolated area along the southern coast of the province. This region has a long history of pro-Communist sentiment which was intensified by the postcoup executions of Communists. Until early this year the area had been inadequately policed because of its relative inaccessibility and sparse population.

The guerrillas at first suppressed local opposition through terrorist activities aimed primarily at local anti-Communist Muslim elements. Later, raids were carried out against military patrols and installations. These operations were supported by an extensive propaganda campaign designed to exploit local antigovernment sentiment.

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Central Java

Although the militant activity in East Java has received more notice, the rebuilding of the party apparatus in Central Java has also gone forward, taking a more pragmatic line. The party's provincial leadership, which has supported central committee policy, apparently has been able to capitalize on a sizable reservoir of experienced former cadres. [REDACTED]

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The capture earlier this year of Sutarto, an important Central Java provincial leader, coupled with the arrests of several couriers

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from East Java, led to the exposure in early June of an extensive party apparatus being consolidated around the city of Solo in Central Java.

as a preliminary to more widespread terrorism. Other incidents have been attributed to a militant splinter group concentrated in Solo and Semarang, or to the spill-over of some East Java elements hard pressed by army operations.

Loss of Party Leaders

The party has recently sustained significant leadership losses.

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Two other centers of intense rebuilding activity have been the cities of Jogjakarta and Semarang.

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Although guerrilla activity in Central Java appears to be in an early phase, some incidents have occurred, probably in the nature of probing actions. In late June, several assassinations of anti-Communists took place in north coast areas, possibly--as had occurred earlier in East Java's Malang-Blitar, area--

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Government successes in Central Java appear to have been fairly extensive.

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The intensive sweep in the Malang-Blitar area of East Java, involving over five battalions, has been largely successful in depriving the party of experienced leaders.

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Nevertheless, the government's campaign appears to have had little positive effect on the political orientation of the general population in East Java's Malang-Blitar area; if anything, army operations have aggravated antigovernment feeling.

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ticular, the government has no effective channel of communication to the populace which could take over when military operations are scaled down.

Outlook

The economic base that the government had hoped to build before the Communists could begin a reconsolidation has not been realized, and the government's anti-Communist effort is thereby rendered increasingly difficult. A greater emphasis than had originally been intended probably will have to be placed on continued military and intelligence operations, and present indications are that the total campaign will be a prolonged one.

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Economic projects, hampered by a lack of funds, have been restricted to a partially completed dam project in East Java, where floods are a serious problem, and limited experimental planting of "miracle rice" in both provinces, which is often held up for lack of qualified personnel and necessary chemicals and equipment. Facilities for health, education, and recreation are seriously lacking. In par-

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